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Abstract
This paper examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a compe-
tition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable
cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel
members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Re-
garding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease
or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.
1 Introduction
Research has extensively explored how competition policy aﬀects whether collusion
is stable and, when it is stable, the price set by cartel members and the cartel’s
duration. For example, there is a large and growing literature that examines the
impact of corporate leniency programs on whether a cartel forms and what price it
sets if it does form.1 All that analysis, however, has made two restrictive assumptions
about the cartel’s composition. First, that the cartel is all-inclusive. Second, that
the inclusiveness of the cartel is fixed with regards to competition policy. Practice
runs contrary to the first assumption in that many cartels comprise some, but not
all, firms in a market2 and, with regards to the second assumption, it is natural to
expect that a tougher competition policy could influence which firms choose to join
a cartel and how inclusive a cartel must be for the cartel to be stable.
The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of competition policy on a
cartel’s size and composition. In earlier work (Bos and Harrington, 2010), the set of
∗We thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments.
†Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Organization &
Strategy. Address: Tongersestraat 53, Maastricht, 6211 LM, The Netherlands. E-mail:
i.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
‡University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Department of Business Economics & Public
Policy. Address: 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19102. E-mail: harrij@wharton.upenn.edu.
1For references, see Spagnolo (2008) and Harrington and Chang (2012).
2Examples are in Harrington (2006) and Bos and Harrington (2010) and references cited therein.
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stable cartels was characterized but in the absence of antitrust enforcement. In this
paper, that model is amended to allow for a competition authority that can detect and
convict cartels and, as a consequence, impose financial penalties and cause the cartel
to shutdown. We also allow for a corporate leniency program so that a cartel member
can receive a reduced penalty in exchange for cooperating with the authorities.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that competition policy results in
the most inclusive stable cartel being less inclusive. In particular, small firms are no
longer cartel members when there are competition laws and an authority to enforce
them. This is a benefit of competition policies - such as a leniency program - that
has not previously been recognized. Second, antitrust enforcement has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the size of the least inclusive stable cartels. If market demand is highly
inelastic then the least inclusive stable cartels encompass more firms, but there are
other market conditions such that the least inclusive stable cartels involve fewer firms.
Combining these results, we find that either antitrust enforcement reduces the range
of sizes of stable cartels - as it increases the size of the smallest cartels and decreases
the size of the largest cartels - or it shifts the range of stable cartels down - making
the most and least inclusive cartels less encompassing.
In the next section, the model is introduced. Section 3 establishes equilibrium
cartel behavior, while Section 4 provides the conditions for a cartel to be stable. The
main results of the paper are in Section 5 which characterizes the impact of antitrust
enforcement on the set of stable cartels, and are complemented with an example in
Section 6. Section 7 oﬀers some implications for competition policy, and Section 8
concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
To explore the impact of competition policy on the inclusiveness of cartels, the
capacity-constrained price-setting repeated game in Bos and Harrington (2010) is
modified to allow for a cartel to be convicted and penalized. Consider an industry
with  ≥ 3 firms producing a homogeneous good at common marginal cost  ≥ 0.3
Let  ≡ {1     } denote the set of firms. Firm  has a fixed production capacity
 and firms have a common discount factor  ∈ (0 1). The setting is one of perfect
monitoring so, in any period, all past prices are common knowledge.
Market demand is given by  () which is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
decreasing function of price. Moreover,  ()  0 and monopoly profit, (− ) (),
is strictly concave. The monopoly price  is defined by:  ()+( − )0 () =
0. In each period, firms simultaneously choose prices from {0      −   +    }
and produce to meet demand up to capacity. Results will be derived for   0 and
suﬃciently small.4 Demand of firm  is denoted  ( −), which depends on its
own price  and the vector of rivals’ prices, −. As in Bos and Harrington (2010),
3Given that we are interested in exploring the inclusivity of cartels, it is necessary to assume there
are at least three firms.
4While there is no explicit reference made to  in the results of this paper, we draw upon results
in Bos and Harrington (2010) which presume  is suﬃciently small.
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three fairly general assumptions are made on firm demand and capacities. In stating
these assumptions, let Φ () ≡ { :  = } denote the set of firms that price at  and
define min− ≡ min {1     −1 +1     } 
A1 lim→0+ 
¡min− +  −¢ = maxn ¡min− ¢−P∈Φ(min− )   0o 
A2 If 0 P∈Φ() ( −) P∈Φ()  then 0   ( −)   ∀ ∈ Φ () 
A3    () and P 6=  ≥  ()  ∀ ∈ 
A1 holds for any well-behaved residual demand function, while A2 imposes some
symmetry across firms. The first part of A3 imposes an upper bound on firm size.
It has the implication that, for prices not exceeding the monopoly price, a firm that
charges a price below all of its rivals is capacity-constrained. The second part of A3
states that any  − 1 firms have suﬃcient production capacity to meet competitive
demand. This assumption ensures that the one-shot game has two symmetric Nash
equilibria with prices of  and  + . Thus, for suﬃciently small , static Nash
equilibrium profit is approximately zero.
Firms can potentially enhance their profits through the formation of a price-fixing
cartel. Consider a cartel Γ ⊆  with common cartel price   + . If Γ ⊂  , then
the cartel faces competition from at least one outsider.5 As proven in Lemma 2 in Bos
and Harrington (2010), non-colluding firms optimally set their prices slightly below
the cartel price and produce up to capacity. Residual cartel demand is then given
by  () − ( −Γ), where  = P∈  and Γ = P∈Γ  denote, respectively,
industry and cartel capacity. Clearly, collusion is beneficial only when the cartel faces
positive demand, which requires  () − ( −Γ)  0 or Γ   − (). Thus,
a necessary condition for a cartel to be successful is that it controls a suﬃciently
large part of industry capacity. Under the assumption that cartel profit is allocated
in proportion to capacity, profit of firm  ∈ Γ is:6
(− ) [ ()− ( −Γ)]
µ 
Γ
¶
.
Firms that take part in a cartel become subject to antitrust enforcement. In each
period in which at least one firm sets the collusive price, the antitrust authority dis-
covers cartel Γ with probability  (Γ) ∈ [0 1]. Thus,  (·) maps from the set of subsets
of  with at least two members into [0 1]  The absence of antitrust enforcement is
when  (·) = 0. In the event of an investigation, conviction occurs for sure and results
in the immediate and permanent break-down of the cartel; hence, firms return to a
static Nash equilibrium forever. With probability 1−  (Γ) there is no investigation
(and thus no chance of conviction) in the current period. Though firms outside of
the cartel benefit from the higher prices - indeed, they price just below the collusive
price - it is customary for them to be innocent of violating the law, and are typically
5⊂ refers to strict set inclusion so that Γ0 ⊂ Γ00 means Γ0 is a strict subset of Γ00.
6A motivation and extensive discussion of this assumption is provided in Bos and Harrington
(2010).
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not liable for customer damages. It is then assumed that they are not subject to
penalties though will be harmed with the subsequent fall in prices due to antitrust
enforcement shutting down the cartel.
As stated in A4, cartels with more members are assumed to have a higher prob-
ability of investigation and conviction.
A4 If Γ0 ⊂ Γ00 then  (Γ0)   (Γ00)  and if  ∈ Γ then lim→0  (Γ ∪ {})   (Γ) 
Thus, the probability of being caught is higher when a cartel adds firms, which strikes
us as a natural assumption. The chances that the competition authority receives a
complaint by a buyer is more likely when more buyers are aﬀected which is the
case when the cartel is more inclusive. If discovery comes from a cartel member
inadvertently revealing information to an uninvolved employee within the firm then
again this is more likely when more people are engaged in collusion which is true
when there are more firms in the cartel. A4 also assumes the increase in probability
from adding a firm to the cartel is bounded above zero even if the additional cartel
member is arbitrarily small in terms of capacity (and, as a result, market share). This
condition seems reasonable given that much of the reason why more members makes
detection more likely is that there are more people with knowledge of the cartel and
thus more opportunities for information to leak out, which is non-trivial even when
a firm is very small.
In case of discovery, a cartel member faces an antitrust penalty that is proportional
to the profit it earned while colluding:
 (− ) [ ()− ( −Γ)]
µ 
Γ
¶
 (1)
where   0 is a penalty multiplier.7 Thus, larger cartel members face a larger
penalty, all else equal. Many jurisdictions have a leniency program that gives cartel
participants the opportunity to turn themselves in in exchange for a reduction of
their penalty. To encompass such a program, assume that if firm  is the first firm to
receive leniency then it pays a penalty equal to the expression in (1) multiplied by
 ∈ [0 1].  is a policy parameter and includes the case of no leniency ( = 1) and
full leniency ( = 0). Of course, in response to an investigation, all cartel members
may simultaneously race for leniency in which case it is natural to suppose that each
has an equal chance of receiving it. If leniency is given only to one firm then a firm
can expect to pay the full penalty multiplied by |Γ|−1+|Γ| ; each cartel member has
probability 1|Γ| of receiving leniency and probability
|Γ|−1
|Γ| of not receiving leniency
and paying the full penalty. To allow for such discounts - as well as other programs
that may impact the penalties actually paid - it is assumed that, in response to a
conviction, a cartel member can expect to pay a penalty equal to (1) multiplied by
7This is a natural specification in jurisdictions that have customer damages. While customer
damages are typically calculated in such a way that they do not generally equal the incremental
profit from collusion, incremental profits are still a good approximation. In jurisdictions where the
primary penalty is government fines then this specification is more problematic because those fines
are often based more on revenue than on profit.
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 (Γ) ∈ (0 1]. Hence, the expected penalty that firm  ∈ Γ faces prior to learning
whether or not there is an investigation is8
 (Γ) (Γ)  (− ) [ ()− ( −Γ)]
µ 
Γ
¶
 (2)
It is assumed  (Γ) is weakly larger for cartels encompassing more members.
A5 If Γ0 ⊂ Γ00 then  (Γ0) ≤  (Γ00) 
The special case of  (Γ) = |Γ|−1+|Γ| obviously satisfies these conditions.9
3 Cartel’s Objective and Equilibrium Price
Consider a cartel Γ with a common cartel price    + . The collusive value for
member  ∈ Γ, denoted  (Γ), is defined recursively by
 (Γ) = (− ) [ ()− ( −Γ)]
µ 
Γ
¶
− (Γ) (Γ)  (− ) [ ()− ( −Γ)]
µ 
Γ
¶
+  (1−  (Γ)) (Γ) 
Solving it for  (Γ) yields
 (Γ) = 
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
(− )
∙ ()− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸
=  (Γ)  (3)
Observe that firm ’s value equals a common value per unit of capacity,  (Γ),
multiplied by its capacity:  (Γ) =  (Γ). When the cartel is not all-inclusive,
non-cartel members optimally set their prices slightly below the cartel price and
produce up to their capacity. Since    () ∀ ∈  (Assumption 3), this implies
that a member that undercuts the collusive price optimally prices at −  or − 2.
Specifically, it will choose − when it is capacity constrained at that price; otherwise
it sets − 2. As to the latter, the cheating firm would be charging the lowest price
in the industry and is therefore capacity constrained by assumption. Consequently,
cutting price further would be unprofitable. Thus, for  suﬃciently small, a cheating
firm  ∈ Γ earns approximately (− )  in terms of current profit and zero future
profit (as all firms revert to static Nash equilibrium pricing).10 Finally, recall that
8While the expression in (2) suggests that  (Γ) is redundant because only  (Γ) (Γ) enters, we
will soon present expressions that depend only on  (Γ).
9One reason why leniency would be given in response to an investigation - even though conviction
occurs for sure - is to save on resources in prosecuting the case. We could also specify  (Γ) as the
probability of an investigation and introduce  as the probability of conviction when there is no
leniency program. In that case,  (Γ) is the probability of paying penalties when firms do not seek
leniency and  (Γ) (Γ) is the probability when they do.
10We conjecture that all results extend to when the cartel can be reformed in the future.
5
there is still a chance of being caught in the period of defection so that cheating
members remain subject to antitrust enforcement. A deviating firm therefore also
has the possibility to simultaneously apply for leniency.
Given a cartel Γ, the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for firm  ∈ Γ is
then µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
(− )
∙ ()− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸

≥ (− )  −min { (Γ) (Γ)  }  (− )
∙ ()− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸

Rearranging, the ICC can be presented as
Ω (Γ) ≡
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
+min { (Γ) (Γ)  }  ≥ Γ ()− ( −Γ)  (4)
Note that the ICC is the same for all cartel members. Whether a cheating firm
finds it optimal to apply for leniency depends on the values of  (Γ) (Γ) and . A
deviating member finds it optimal to turn itself in (prior to any investigation) only
when leniency is suﬃciently generous (   (Γ) (Γ)) and otherwise prefers not to
self-report (   (Γ) (Γ)).11
The cartel’s problem is to choose price to maximize cartel value per unit of ca-
pacity subject to the ICC:
∗ (Γ) = argmax
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
(− )
∙ ()− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸
(5)
subject to
Ω (Γ) ≥ Γ ()− ( −Γ)  (6)
Let b (Γ) be the maximum price that satisfies the ICC: b (Γ) ≡ −1 ( −Γ + (ΓΩ (Γ))) 
Hence, firms can only sustain a price above cost when
−1 ( −Γ + (ΓΩ (Γ)))  ⇒ Ω (Γ)  Γ ()− ( −Γ)  (7)
This condition is guaranteed to hold when  (Γ) → 0 and  → 1, provided that a
suﬃcient amount of industry capacity is under the control of the cartel. Since the
11Note that it is assumed a deviating firm pays a penalty proportional to its profit when it set the
collusive price. If deviation occurred in the first period of collusion, it would seem more reasonable
to assume that it is proportional to the profit it received while deviating. If deviation occurred after
many periods of collusion then the penalty ought to be proportional to average profit during the time
of the cartel which will be a weighted average of collusive profit (for the many periods of collusion)
and deviation profit (for the one period of deviation) which will be close to collusive profit. We chose
the latter specification since it describes the steady-state. However, we have no reason to think that
our conclusions are sensitive to this assumption.
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objective function is strictly concave,
2 (Γ)
2 =
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶µ
20 () + (− )00 ()
Γ
¶
 0
the first-order condition is suﬃcient to determine the non-binding solution. Let  (Γ)
denote the unconstrained optimal cartel price:
 ( (Γ))− ( −Γ) + ( (Γ)− )0 ( (Γ)) = 0 (8)
Observe that the unconstrained solution is independent of antitrust enforcement. Fi-
nally, since  (Γ) is strictly concave in , it follows that ∗ (Γ) = min {b (Γ)   (Γ)} 
The equilibrium collusive value for a cartel Γ is then
 ∗ (Γ) ≡  (∗ (Γ) Γ) =
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
(∗ (Γ)− )
∙ (∗ (Γ))− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸

(9)
Consistent with previous work for all-inclusive cartels, more intense antitrust
enforcement reduces the optimal cartel price by tightening the ICC. Thus, for a given
cartel, a stricter antitrust regime leads to a weakly lower cartel price.
Theorem 1 For cartel Γ, ∗ (Γ) is non-increasing in  (Γ)   (Γ), and . If ∗ (Γ) 
 (Γ), then ∗ (Γ) is decreasing in  (Γ)   (Γ), and .
4 Defining the Set of Stable Cartels
Let us now direct our attention to cartel formation and identifying what coalition
configurations are stable. d’Aspremont et al (1983) was among the first to provide a
clear and intuitive notion of cartel stability. A cartel is considered to be stable when
(i) none of its members wants to leave the cartel (internal stability) and (ii) none of
the non-cartel members wants to join the cartel (external stability).
To derive the exact conditions in our model for a cartel to be both internally and
externally stable, consider some candidate cartel Γ. The equilibrium value to firm
 is  ∗ (Γ) when  ∈ Γ and is [∗(Γ)−]1−(1−(Γ)) when  ∈ Γ. Define  (Γ) to be the
equilibrium value to firm  when  ∈ Γ and it does not join the cartel, and when
 ∈ Γ and it joins the cartel.  (Γ) is then the payoﬀ that firm  expects if it acts
contrary to expectations about cartel membership, whether it means not joining the
cartel when it should have or joining the cartel when it should not have.12 With
these equilibrium values, a cartel is stable when all cartel members strictly prefer
12 In thinking about a firm joining a cartel for which it was not expected to be a member, the issue
is not whether a firm can force its way into a cartel but rather whether it desires to join a cartel for
which it was not expected to be a member. As it turns out, if the existing members of a cartel find
it unprofitable for an outsider to join then that outsider will find it unprofitable as well; thus, a firm
will never want to try and force itself on a cartel. The problematic situation is when a firm prefers
not to join a cartel and existing cartel members would like for it to join.
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to be a member (internal stability) and all non-members weakly prefer not to be a
member (external stability). Internal stability requires a strict preference for cartel
membership in order to rule out the trivial case in which firms are members of a
cartel but the cartel prices the same as when there is no cartel (that is, at cost).
Definition 2 A cartel Γ is stable if: i)  ∗ (Γ)   (Γ) for all  ∈ Γ ; and ii)
[∗(Γ)−]
1−(1−(Γ)) ≥ (Γ) for all  ∈ Γ
In specifying (Γ), it is standard in the literature (including our earlier paper) to
assume that, regardless of firms’ decisions as to whether or not to join the cartel, the
resulting cartel acts according to the equilibrium yielding the highest collusive value.
While that is a natural specification when firms act according to expectations with
respect to the cartel membership decision, there could be other reasonable responses
when firms do not act according to expectations, either by not joining a cartel for
which it was supposed to be a member or joining a cartel for which it was not
supposed to be a member. A novel feature of our approach is to consider various
equilibria in response to such events. One equilibrium is the standard specification:
the cartel accommodates the disequilibrium membership decision by achieving the
maximal level of collusion given whichever firms are in the cartel. We refer to this as
the accommodative equilibrium and it implies:
if  ∈ Γ then  (Γ) = [
∗ (Γ\{})− ] 
1−  (1−  (Γ\{})) 
and
if  ∈ Γ then  (Γ) =  ∗ (Γ ∪ {}) 
An alternative equilibrium is that the cartel responds in a punishing manner by
disbanding so that all firms receive the static Nash equilibrium payoﬀ. Referring to
it as the aggressive equilibrium,  (Γ) = 0 ∀. There are other equilibria one could
consider.
In performing an equilibrium selection, we are guided by the objective of this
paper which is to assess the eﬀect of antitrust enforcement on the range of stable
cartels. Hence, we will consider the most expansive set of cartels. Given that the
aggressive equilibrium is the equilibrium with the lowest payoﬀs, if a cartel is not
stable with the aggressive equilibrium then it is not stable with any other equilibrium.
This then argues to specifying the aggressive equilibrium. However, one modification
to that specification is appropriate on plausibility grounds. It would seem nonsensical
for a cartel to punish a cartel member for departing or a non-cartel member for
joining when such an action actually improves the payoﬀs of cartel members. Thus,
when entry into (exit from) the cartel enhances the value of the original (remaining)
members of the cartel, it is assumed that the accommodative equilibrium ensues.
This assumption is embodied in the following two conditions used in evaluating the
stability of cartel Γ. First,
if  ∈ Γ and  ∗ (Γ ∪ {})   ∗ (Γ) then  (Γ) =  ∗ (Γ ∪ {}) ; (10)
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that is, if an outsider joining the cartel raises each original cartel member’s payoﬀ
under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in
fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. Second,
if  ∈ Γ and  ∗ (Γ\ {})   ∗ (Γ) then  (Γ) = [
∗ (Γ\{})− ] 
1−  (1−  (Γ\{})) ; (11)
that is, if an insider leaving the cartel raises each remaining cartel member’s payoﬀ
under the supposition of the accommodative equilibrium then cartel members do in
fact respond with the accommodative equilibrium. For all other cases, cartel members
respond with the aggressive equilibrium so  (Γ) = 0.
5 Impact of a Competition Authority on the Set of Sta-
ble Cartels
First note that if antitrust enforcement is suﬃciently strong then no cartels are stable
because collusion is ineﬀective at sustaining prices above the non-collusive price. That
is not the scenario examined here. Instead, we are considering when stable cartels still
exist and asking whether they tend to be larger or smaller compared to the absence
of antitrust enforcement. Given that there can be many stable cartels, the analysis
will focus on the impact on the range of cartel size.13 For this purpose, we define:
Definition 3 Γ0 is a minimal stable cartel if Γ0 is stable and Γ is not a stable
cartel for all Γ ⊂ Γ0
Definition 4 Γ0 is a maximal stable cartel if Γ0 is stable and Γ is not a stable
cartel for all Γ ⊃ Γ0
A minimal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there is no sub-coalition of that
cartel which is stable, while a maximal stable cartel is a stable cartel for which there
is no super-coalition containing that cartel which is stable. There can be multiple
minimal and maximal stable cartels.
The impact of antitrust enforcement on the size of maximal stable cartels is
examined in Section 5.1 and on the size of minimal stable cartels in Section 5.2.
It’ll be shown that competition policy can reduce the size of the largest cartels but,
depending on the circumstances, can either increase or decrease the size of the smallest
cartels.
5.1 Maximal Cartel Size
The task is to compare the size of maximal stable cartels with and without antitrust
enforcement. As a benchmark, Lemma 5 shows that if collusion is sustainable in
the absence of a competition authority - for which   −() is a necessary and
13Multiplicity of stable cartels is common in these types of models; see, for example, Donsimoni
(1985), Donsimoni et al (1986) and Diamantoudi (2005).
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suﬃcient condition - then there is a unique maximal cartel and it is the all-inclusive
cartel.14
Lemma 5 Assume   −() . In the absence of antitrust enforcement, the maxi-
mal stable cartel is the all-inclusive cartel.
It is an immediate corollary that antitrust enforcement cannot cause the largest
stable cartel to be more inclusive. Thus, the issue is whether it can cause the largest
stable cartel to contract. While the all-inclusive cartel generates the highest profits
without antitrust enforcement, this may no longer be true with an antitrust author-
ity because expected penalties are increasing in cartel size. While each additional
member to the cartel adds value for the original cartel members by restricting its
supply below its capacity, it also creates a cost to those original members by increas-
ing the probability of discovery and conviction (and perhaps reducing the chances
of an original member receiving leniency since now there will be more firms striving
for it). Given that the impact on the collusive price from a firm joining a cartel is
positively related to firm size - a larger firm brings more capacity under the control
of the cartel which means output is restricted more and price rises more - a suﬃ-
ciently small firm may not raise the collusive price enough to oﬀset having increased
expected penalties. As a result, a small firm earns higher profit outside of the cartel -
which is the case whether or not there is antitrust enforcement - and, in addition, the
remaining cartel members also earn higher profit when a small firm remains outside
of the cartel - which is only true when there is antitrust enforcement and is because
expected penalties are lower. This leads us to Theorem 6 which shows that antitrust
enforcement results in small firms not being members of stable cartels.
Theorem 6 In the presence of antitrust enforcement, ∃  0 such that if   
then firm  is not a member of a stable cartel
A corollary of this result is that if a market has suﬃciently small firms then the
cartel is not all-inclusive.
Corollary 7 In the presence of antitrust enforcement, ∃  0 such that if    for
some  ∈  then a maximal stable cartel is not all-inclusive.
Without a competition authority, the all-inclusive cartel is the most profitable -
in terms of value per unit of cartel capacity - and it is stable because cartel members
can threaten to dismantle the cartel if any member leaves. However, when there
is a competition authority, the most profitable cartel can be less than all-inclusive
because additional members raise expected penalties and this can exceed the benefits
from controlling more capacity. In particular, the most inclusive stable cartel will
exclude small firms. Thus, competition policy not only reduces price for a given
14We did not necessarily find the all-inclusive cartel to be stable in Bos and Harrington (2010)
because the accommodative equilibrium was used in assessing internal stability. Here, we assume
the aggressive equilibrium except where previously noted.
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cartel (Theorem 1) but also deters small firms from joining the cartel and, therefore,
cartels are no longer all-inclusive.15
5.2 Minimal Cartel Size
Next we turn to considering the smallest stable cartels. A cartel can be "not inclusive
enough" with respect to stability for either of two reasons. First, it may not control
enough capacity to sustain any collusion; that is, the collusive price is just the static
Nash equilibrium price. In that case, the cartel is not internally stable. Second, it
may not be externally stable in that a non-member prefers to join because doing so
suﬃciently raises the collusive price and the rise in the new member’s price-cost mar-
gin is enough to oﬀset it having lower output and becoming liable for penalties. Using
these two conditions, the analysis in this section shows that antitrust enforcement
can either make the smallest cartels more inclusive or less inclusive.
The next result provides conditions whereby the smallest cartels are at least as
large when there is antitrust enforcement. Specifically, when some cartels are unstable
without antitrust enforcement then they are unstable with antitrust enforcement.
Hence, if Γ0 is a minimal stable cartel without a competition authority - which means
that sub-coalitions are unstable - then those sub-coalitions are still unstable when
there is a competition authority. If Γ0 is still stable in an environment with antitrust
enforcement then it remains a minimal stable cartel and, if it is no longer stable, then
a minimal stable cartel either strictly contains Γ0 or there is no minimal stable cartel
containing Γ0
Theorem 8 In the absence of antitrust enforcement, assume Γ0 is a minimal stable
cartel and ∗ (Γ) =  for all Γ ⊂ Γ0. Then, in the presence of antitrust enforcement,
Γ is not stable for all Γ ⊂ Γ0
In establishing that minimal stable cartel size is weakly higher with antitrust
enforcement, Theorem 8 presumed that, without antitrust enforcement, ∗ (Γ) = 
for all subsets of the minimal stable cartel. We’ll now derive a suﬃcient condition
for that property to hold. Given that (7) is necessary and suﬃcient for a cartel to
support a collusive price (that is, a price exceeding cost), re-arranging (7) it follows
that Γ0 is a smallest cartel which can support a collusive price if and only if
Γ0   −() ≥ Γ0 − , for all  ∈ Γ
0 (12)
15While this intuitive result is not surprising, it is worth noting that its derivation does require
properly defining the conditions for a stable cartel so that it does not rely on nonsensical responses
to leaving or joining a cartel (see the discussion surrounding (10)-(11)). For suppose instead no
restrictions are placed on how equilibria are used. In that case, a cartel is defined to be stable when:
1) there exists an equilibrium E* such that if a cartel member were to leave the cartel and E* were to
result then the firm prefers to remain in the cartel; and 2) there exists an equilibrium E** such that
if a non-cartel member were to join the cartel and E** were to result then the firm prefers to remain
outside the cartel. With that specification then, even under antitrust enforcement, the all-inclusive
cartel is the maximal stable cartel (as long as the all-inclusive cartel is able to sustain a price above
cost); in other words, an analogue to Lemma 5 is true. Thus, for antitrust enforcement to cause the
maximal stable cartel to exclude suﬃciently small firms requires properly defining what it means to
be a stable cartel.
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The LHS inequality ensures that Γ0 can sustain a price above cost - and thus it is
internally stable - and the RHS inequality ensures that any subset of Γ0 cannot.16 Γ0
is externally stable if and only if
µ
1
1− 
¶¡∗ ¡Γ0¢− ¢  ≥ µ 1
1− 
¶¡∗ ¡Γ0 ∪ {}¢− ¢µ (∗ (Γ0 ∪ {}))− +Γ0 + Γ0 + 
¶
 ,
for all  ∈ Γ0
where the LHS is the payoﬀ to firm  ∈ Γ0 being outside of cartel Γ0 and the RHS is
the payoﬀ to it joining cartel Γ0. Re-arranging this condition yields17£∗ ¡Γ0 ∪ {}¢− ¤ £ − ¡∗ ¡Γ0 ∪ {}¢¢¤ (13)
≥ £∗ ¡Γ0 ∪ {}¢− ∗ ¡Γ0¢¤ (Γ0 + ) , for all  ∈ Γ0
Intuitively, given that a firm that joins the cartel goes from producing at capacity
to producing below capacity, a necessary condition for it to find it profitable to
join a cartel is that, by bringing more capacity under the control of the cartel, the
collusive price is suﬃciently higher. (Recall that both insiders and outsiders charge,
approximately, the same price.)
Examining (13), if the rise in price from joining the cartel, ∗ (Γ0 ∪ {})−∗ (Γ0) 
is suﬃciently small then Γ0 is externally stable. Here are two examples for which
∗ (Γ0 ∪ {}) − ∗ (Γ0) will be small. First,  is small in which case all non-cartel
members have little eﬀect on price from joining the cartel. Second, market demand
is perfectly inelastic with a choke price:  () = 0 for  ≤  (with   ) and
 () = 0 for   . In that case, it can be shown that the collusive price is the
choke price  and thus is unaﬀected by firm  joining the cartel. That result is robust
to allowing market demand to be highly inelastic as long as it still implies that the
collusive price is the choke price.18 Section 6 also provides an example with linear
demand and symmetric firms for which (12) and (13) hold.
Now let us presume the condition in Theorem 8 does not hold. In that case,
it is possible that antitrust enforcement reduces the size of a minimal stable cartel.
Specifically, consider a cartel that was not externally stable in the absence of antitrust
enforcement because a firm outside of the cartel found it profitable to join because
16As long as  is close enough to 1 - so that a large enough cartel can collude and thus the LHS
inequality holds - there exist Γ0 such that (12) is true because the RHS is sure to hold when |Γ0| = 2
as then a subset of Γ0 is the degenerate cartel of one firm which, by our assumptions, cannot sustain
price above cost (because the static Nash equilibrium has price equal to cost).
17To be clear, the condition in Theorem 8 - Γ0 is a minimal stable cartel and ∗ (Γ) =  for all
Γ ⊂ Γ0 - holds if and only if (12) and (13) hold.
18Highly inelastic market demand may plausibly hold for cartels that sell an input to industrial
buyers where the input makes up a small part of the cost of producing the industrial buyer’s product.
For example, consider the lysine cartel (Connor, 2001). Lysine is used to build tissue in hogs and is
a very small part of the cost of producing hogs. Thus, the price of lysine could significantly increase
without much of a change in the demand for hogs and thus without much of a change in the derived
market demand for lysine. Furthermore, the choke price could be the price at which customers switch
over to the next best alternative.
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it would significantly increase the collusive price. With antitrust enforcement, that
same cartel may now be externally stable when the addition of that firm suﬃciently
increases the likelihood of detection and as a result it is no longer profitable to join.
As long as the cartel can still sustain a collusive price, it is also internally stable.
Theorem 9 In the absence of antitrust enforcement, assume Γ0 is a minimal stable
cartel and ∗ (Γ00)   for some Γ00 ⊂ Γ0. Then, in the presence of antitrust en-
forcement, there exist  (·) such that Γ00 is stable; hence, it is a subset of Γ0 that is a
minimal stable cartel.
For the condition in Theorem 9 to hold, one needs to show that, in the absence
of antitrust enforcement, there exists Γ0 such that: 1) Γ0 is stable; 2) ∀Γ ⊂ Γ0 Γ is
unstable (so that Γ0 is a minimal stable cartel); and 3) ∃Γ ⊂ Γ0 such that ∗ (Γ)  
There must then be cartels that are internally stable (that is, able to sustain a
collusive price) but are not externally stable because a firm would want to join for the
purpose of suﬃciently raising price. Here we oﬀer some suﬃcient conditions (details
are in the Online Appendix). Assume  ' 1 so that, without antitrust enforcement,
the collusive price is the unconstrained price. Assuming () = 1−, it can be shown
that cartel Γ is internally stable (that is, ∗(Γ)  ) if and only if Γ   − 1 + 
and is externally stable (that is, an outsider does not increase its profit by joining)
if and only if  ≤
q
2Γ − ( − 1 + )2∀ ∈ Γ19 Firm  does not want to join if it
is suﬃciently small which makes sense since joining will not have much of an impact
on the collusive price - given that non-cartel capacity has declined by only a small
amount - but will have a proportionally large eﬀect on firm ’s supply. Consider
cartels comprising the largest firms: Γ () ≡ {1 }  where 1 ≥ · · · ≥ . There
exists cartels satisfying the property in Theorem 9 if there exists  such that:
1 + · · ·+ −1 ≤  − 1 +   1 + · · ·+  
q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2 (14)
The first two inequalities imply that cartel Γ () is the smallest cartel that is able
to sustain a collusive price, and the third inequality implies that the cartel is not
externally stable because firm  + 1 wants to join it.20 Given that  − 1 +  q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2 then there exists capacity vectors satisfying (14).
5.3 Discussion
Based upon the preceding analysis, let us draw out some general insight regarding how
the introduction of a competition authority aﬀects the set of stable cartels. Without
antitrust enforcement, the rationale for joining a cartel is that it raises the collusive
price - by bringing more capacity under the control of the cartel - but at the cost that
19As shown in the Online Appendix, this last inequality is a re-arranging of the condition that
firm ’s profit outside of cartel Γ is at least as great as its profit from joining Γ.
20Using the condition mentioned above, cartel Γ () is not externally stable if +1 
2Γ() − ( − 1 + )2 Re-arranging this condition delivers the third inequality in (14).
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the firm must then constrain its supply below capacity. With antitrust enforcement,
there is an additional cost of joining which is that the firm now becomes liable for
penalties. Given the associated reduction in profit from becoming a cartel member,
it is more likely that any cartel satisfies external stability. As a result, cartels that
were externally stable without antitrust enforcement are probably externally stable
with antitrust enforcement. The impact on cartel size is then in terms of making
previously (externally) unstable cartels now (externally) stable. Specifically, in the
absence of antitrust enforcement, a relatively small cartel may have been unstable
because a firm wanted to join in order to expand cartel capacity and raise the collusive
price. Now that there is antitrust enforcement, the prospect of becoming liable for
penalties may discourage that firm from joining in which case that small cartel is now
externally stable. It would then seem that antitrust enforcement augments external
stability - firms are less inclined to join a cartel - and this may result in smaller cartels
now being stable.
Turning to internal stability, it requires, first, that the cartel has enough capacity
so that a collusive price can be sustained, and, second, that the cartel value does
not rise in response to a member leaving. If the latter condition did not hold then
the remaining cartel members would accommodate a firm exiting and, given that
accommodation, the exiting firm would earn more profit outside of the cartel. The
preceding analysis suggests that a competition authority makes it less likely that a
cartel will satisfy internal stability. We know that enforcement (weakly) reduces the
collusive price by tightening the ICC. Thus, it could cause a cartel to lose the ability
to sustain a collusive price and thereby cause the cartel to be internally unstable. To
successfully collude, the cartel may then need to be more inclusive in order to control
more capacity. Hence, antitrust enforcement may result in small cartels becoming
larger in order to sustain a collusive price. However, for the most inclusive cartels,
antitrust enforcement may undermine internal stability for a very diﬀerent reason.
A firm contributes to cartel value by having the cartel control more capacity which
then allows it to raise the collusive price but, at the same time, it detracts from cartel
value by increasing the probability of discovery. Thus, antitrust enforcement could
result in cartel value being enhanced by a firm leaving the cartel (which also implies
the firm finds it profitable to leave) which makes the cartel internally unstable. This
force means that antitrust enforcement will tend to reduce the size of large cartels. In
sum, antitrust enforcement undermines internal stability which can cause the smallest
cartels to be larger and the largest cartels to be smaller.
6 Example
In this section, a linear demand symmetric quadropoly is investigated for the purpose
of making three points. First, we show that the conditions under which antitrust
enforcement expands minimal cartel size (Theorem 8) are quite plausible. Second,
antitrust enforcement - by expanding the minimal stable cartel - is shown to increase
price. Third, it is shown that more intense antitrust enforcement can cause the
maximal cartel size to expand and the associated collusive price to rise. These results
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serve to flesh out the subtle and potentially counterproductive eﬀects of antitrust
enforcement when the composition of a cartel is endogenized.
Assume four identical firms, each with  units of capacity, and linear demand,
 () = − . Assumption A3 requires
− 
3
   − 
2
 (15)
so that an individual firm has insuﬃcient capacity to supply the monopoly quantity
and, after excluding one of the firms, the remaining firms have suﬃcient capacity to
supply the competitive quantity. Assume  ∼= 1 so that, without antitrust enforce-
ment, the ICC is not binding. This implies that if − − ( −Γ)  0 (so cartel
Γ has some residual demand if it were to price at cost) then the collusive price is
∗ () = − ( −Γ) + 
2 =
− (−)+ 
2  (16)
where  = |Γ| (and recall that firms have identical capacities so only the number of
firms in the cartel matters).
To begin, let us derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a two-firm cartel
to be stable in the absence of antitrust enforcement. A two-firm cartel is internally
stable if ∗ (2)   which is indeed true because   (− ) 2 (from (15)) implies
there is residual demand for a two-firm cartel: − − 2  0 A two-firm cartel is
then stable if it is also externally stable; the condition for which is
(∗ (2)− ) ≥ (∗ (3)− ) [− − ∗ (3)] (13)  (17)
The LHS is the profit to a non-cartel member when there is a two-firm cartel and the
RHS is the profit to a member of a three-firm cartel. Inserting the expression for the
collusive price from (16), (17) isµ− 2+ 
2 − 
¶
 ≥
µ− + 
2 − 
¶ ∙
− − 
µ− + 
2
¶¸
(13) 
and simplifying yields: −132 + 8 (− )− (− )2 ≥ 0 which implies

−  ∈
"
8−√12
26
 8 +
√
12
26
#
∼= [175 440] (18)
Combining restrictions in (15) and (18):

−  ∈
Ã
1
3
 8 +
√
12
26
#
(19)
Thus, if (19) is true then the conditions of Theorem 8 hold in that the minimal stable
cartel has two firms and any smaller cartel (which necessarily has a single firm) has
price equal to cost.
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Next let us derive suﬃcient conditions for antitrust enforcement to raise the min-
imal stable cartel from two firms to either three or four firms. Assume  (Γ) = 1 ∀Γ,
 = 1 and  = 0 so there is no leniency program and penalties are zero.21 Thus,
antitrust enforcement in this example operates by discovering and convicting cartels
and thereby shutting them down. Under these assumptions - and recalling that  ∼= 1
- the ICC from (4) takes the form:
1
 () ≥

 ()− ( −) (20)
where  () refers to the probability of cartel Γ paying penalties and  = |Γ|. With
antitrust enforcement, a two-firm cartel is not stable if (20) does not hold strictly for
 =  :
2
− − 2 ≥
1
 (2) ⇒

−  ≥
1
2 (1 +  (2))  (21)
For (21) to be consistent with (19), we need
8 +
√
12
26
≥ 1
2 (1 +  (2)) ⇒  (2) ≥
5−√12
8 +
√
12
∼= 134
With antitrust enforcement, a three firm-cartel is internally stable when (20) holds
strictly for  = 3 and  =  :
1
 (3) 
3
− −  ⇒

−  
1
 (3) 3 + 1  (22)
If, in addition, the three-firm cartel is externally stable then it is the minimal stable
cartel. If it is not externally stable then it means that the remaining non-cartel
member prefers to join the cartel and, therefore, the four-firm cartel is internally
stable (and it is trivially externally stable). Combining (21) and (22),
1
2 (1 +  (2)) ≤

−  
1
 (3) 3 + 1  (23)
If (23) holds then, under antitrust enforcement, the minimal stable cartel has either
three or four firms.
Combining the conditions in (19) and (23), the minimal stable cartel has two
firms in the absence of antitrust enforcement and has either three or four firms with
antitrust enforcement when
max
½
1
3
 1
2 (1 +  (2))
¾
 −   min
(
8 +
√
12
26
 1 (3) 3 + 1
)
 (24)
Examining the LHS inequality,
1
3
 1
2 (1 +  (2)) ⇔  (2) 
1
2

21Results are continuous with respect to  and thus hold as long as penalties are not too strong.
While we have no reason to think that our conclusions are tied to assuming penalties are weak,
allowing   0 complicates the expressions.
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Turning to the RHS inequality,
8 +
√
12
26
 1 (3) 3 + 1 ⇔  (3) 
18−√12
3
¡
8 +
√
12
¢ ∼= 422
Thus, if  (2)   (3)  422 then (24) becomes
1
2 (1 +  (2)) 

−  
8 +
√
12
26
 (25)
and we already showed that this interval is non-empty when  (2) ≥ 134
In sum, (24) is satisfied when 134   (2)   (3)  422 and (25) holds. For
example, if  (2) = 3   (3)  422 then (25) is  (− ) ∈ (385 441). Under
those parameter conditions, antitrust enforcement causes the minimal stable cartel
to expand from two firms to either three or four firms.
The preceding analysis showed that antitrust enforcement can cause a cartel to
be more encompassing when firms settle on the minimally stable cartel. Our second
objective is to show that price can be higher. As cartel size increases from two firms
to three or four firms, the collusive price will definitely rise if cartel members are
able to sustain the unconstrained optimal collusive price in (16) (so the ICC is not
binding). Though it is assumed  = 1, it is not immediate that the ICC is not
binding because the probability that the cartel is caught and shut down is positive.
Nevertheless, conditions will be derived on those probabilities such that antitrust
enforcement increases both the size of the minimal stable cartel and price.
For a three-firm cartel, the ICC is satisfied at the unconstrained optimal collusive
price if and only if
1
 (3) ≥
3
−  ¡−+2 ¢−  ⇒ −  ≤ 11 +  (3) 6 
The analogous property for a four-firm cartel is
1
 (4) ≥
4
−  ¡+2 ¢ ⇒ −  ≤ 18 (4) 
Combining these two conditions yields

−  ≤ min
½
1
1 +  (3) 6 
1
8 (4)
¾
 (26)
Given that 11+(3)6 ≤ 11+(3)3 then, combining (26) with (24), we have
max
½
1
3
 1
2 (1 +  (2))
¾
 −   min
(
8 +
√
12
26
 1 (3) 6 + 1 
1
8 (4)
)

It is straightforward to show that if 134   (2)   (3)   (4)  25 then22
max
½
1
3
 1
2 +  (2) 2
¾
 min
(
8 +
√
12
26
 1 (3) 6 + 1 
1
8 (4)
)
22One method of derivation is to assume  (2) =  (3) =  (4) =  and show that max

1
3
 1
2+2



−  min

8+
√
12
26  16+1  18

is non-empty for all  ∈ (134 25) 
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and therefore there exist values for  (− ) such that: 1) without antitrust en-
forcement, the minimal stable cartel has two firms; 2) with antitrust enforcement,
the minimal stable cartel has either three or four firms; and 3) for the minimal stable
cartel, the collusive price is higher with antitrust enforcement than without antitrust
enforcement.23
Continuing with the preceding structure, we will now consider an initial level of
antitrust enforcement such that a maximal stable cartel has three firms and then
show how intensifying antitrust enforcement can expand the maximal stable cartel
to be all-inclusive and also raise the collusive price. If ∗ (Γ)   then a cartel is
internally stable if and only if the exit of a cartel member does not raise the expected
profit of the remaining firms.24 The condition for all cartel members  ∈ Γ to earn at
least as high profit when firm  ∈ Γ is part of the cartel as opposed to being outside
the cartel isµ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
(∗ (Γ)− )
∙ (∗ (Γ))− ( −Γ)
Γ
¸

≥
µ
1−  (Γ\{}) (Γ\{}) 
1−  (1−  (Γ\{}))
¶
(∗ (Γ\{})− )
∙ (∗ (Γ\{}))− ( −Γ + )
Γ − 
¸

Rearranging, using symmetry, and setting  (Γ) = 1  = 0  = 1 this condition
takes the form:µ
1
 ()
¶
(∗ ()− )
∙ (∗ ())− (−)

¸
(27)
≥
µ
1
 (− 1)
¶
(∗ (− 1)− )
∙ (∗ (− 1))− (−+ 1)
(− 1)
¸

A four-firm (all-inclusive) cartel is then not internally stable when (27) does not hold:
4 (4) (∗ (3)− ) [ (∗ (3))− ]  3 (3) (∗ (4)− ) (∗ (4))  (28)
Suppose the collusive price is the unconstrained price,
∗ () = − (−)+ 
2  (29)
which is the case when

−  ≤ min
½
1
1 +  (3) 6 
1
8 (4)
¾

Substituting (29) into (28), internal stability is violated if
4 (4)
µ− + 
2 − 
¶ ∙
− 
µ− + 
2
¶
− 
¸
 3 (3)
µ+ 
2 − 
¶ ∙
− 
µ+ 
2
¶¸

23Note that these are suﬃcient but not necessary conditions since they presume  () is suﬃciently
low that an -firm cartel can sustain the unconstrained optimal collusive price.
24The reason is that if a firm’s exit lowers a remaining cartel member’s profit then the aggressive
equilibrium ensues and, given ∗ (Γ)  , that implies lower profit for the exiting firm; hence, it
would not want to exit.
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which, after simplifying, is
 (4)
 (3) 
µ
3
4
¶µ − 
− − 
¶2
 (30)
Suppose (30) is true so that a four-firm cartel is not internally stable.
Now suppose antitrust enforcement is changed so that  (·) is replaced with b (·).
Assume ICCs hold at unconstrained collusive prices for both three-firm and four-firm
cartels under both antitrust regimes:

−  ≤ min
½
1
1 +  (3) 6 
1
8 (4) 
1
1 + b (3) 6  18b (4)
¾
 (31)
A four-firm cartel is now internally stable if the converse to (30) holds. Thus, if
 (4)
 (3) 
µ
3
4
¶µ − 
− − 
¶2
≥ b (4)b (3) (32)
then the maximal stable cartel is a three-firm cartel under  (·) and, under the new
antitrust regime of b (·), the maximal stable cartel expands to four firms. The collusive
price rises as well since the unconstrained collusive price is increasing with cartel size.
Suﬃcient conditions for (31) and (32) to hold are:  (3)   (4) b (3) b (4) are
small,  (4)  (3) is large, and b (4) b (3) is small. Note that antitrust enforcement
could have intensified so b (·)   (·)  For example, suppose, under the original an-
titrust regime, the probability of discovery is very low except when the cartel is
all-inclusive, 0 '  (3)   (4); and, under the new antitrust regime, the probability
of discovery is increased to  (4) for all cartel sizes: b (3) ' b (4) '  (4). In that
case (for some values of ), intensifying enforcement results in the maximal cartel
size expanding and the associated collusive price rising.
7 Some Implications for Competition Policy
If the composition of the cartel is assumed to be fixed with respect to competition
policy then the introduction of antitrust enforcement or a rise in antitrust enforcement
will cause the collusive price to decline (Theorem 1). When cartel membership is
allowed to respond to competition policy then its impact is more subtle and nuanced.
While antitrust enforcement could cause cartel size to contract and collusive price
to fall, we also find that the opposite can be true. The introduction of antitrust
enforcement can cause minimal cartel size to expand and the collusive price to rise,
while more aggressive antitrust enforcement could expand maximal cartel size and
raise the collusive price.
Though the relationship between antitrust enforcement and cartel size is too com-
plex for us to provide specific guidance for enforcement policies, there is still some
general advice that the theory can deliver. The pathological eﬀects of antitrust en-
forcement - whereby cartels are bigger and the collusive price is higher - is attributable
to the following force. Antitrust enforcement can make collusion unsustainable for
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small cartels which causes more firms to join the cartel in order to sustain a supra-
competitive price, and this can ultimately result in a higher collusive price; or a rise
in antitrust enforcement which is not proportionally more intensive for larger car-
tels makes it more attractive for firms to form a more inclusive cartel. This would
then suggest the adoption of policies that are not simply more aggressive but are
progressively more aggressive for more inclusive cartels. With such a policy, a rise in
enforcement which destabilizes the smallest stable cartel and inclines firms to expand
the cartel may no longer be a viable response if enforcement is more severe for larger
cartels. In other words, the level of antitrust enforcement doesn’t just matter but
also its gradient with respect to cartel inclusiveness.
To make this insight more concrete in terms of recommendations, consider two
policies that have been proposed for enhancing the discovery of cartels: screening and
whistleblowing. Screening involves the use of market data (such as prices and market
shares) in order to identify suspicious patterns that may suggest the presence of a
cartel and thus warrant investigation (Harrington, 2007). Screening will raise  (·)
but probably not aﬀect its sensitivity to cartel size since its eﬃcacy is not related to
how many firms are involved in the cartel. Whistleblowing is the provision of financial
rewards to individuals uninvolved in a cartel who provide information leading to a
conviction. Like screening, whistleblowing will raise  (·) but, in contrast to screening,
it will make  (·) more sensitive to the number of cartel members; the more firms
involved in the cartel, the more uninvolved employees there are who could uncover
evidence of a cartel and report it to the competition authority. The analysis of
this paper suggests that whistleblowing is a more attractive avenue than screening
because it is more likely to constrain cartel size. This is a point worth making since
whistleblowing has been discussed for many years (as early as Kovacic, 2000) but has
only been adopted in three jurisdictions: Hungary, Korea, and the United Kingdom.
An analogous line of argument delivers a previously unidentified benefit from a
leniency program. For simplicity, consider a leniency program in which only the first
firm to apply receives amnesty and all fines are waived. In the context of our model,
this means  (Γ) = (|Γ|− 1)  |Γ| and, conditional on an investigation, the penalty to
firm  is ((|Γ|− 1)  |Γ|)  where  is firm ’s profit as a cartel member. Thus, for
any level of cartel profit, the penalty is higher when the number of cartel members,
|Γ|  is higher. The intuition is simple enough. When there is a leniency program,
a more inclusive cartel is less attractive because there are more firms with which to
compete for leniency, if it should come down to wanting it.
Finally, note that if competition policies are such that  (Γ) and  (Γ) are inde-
pendent of Γ then the maximal stable cartel is the all-inclusive cartel (assuming it
is able to sustain a supracompetitive price). By instead making  (Γ) and/or  (Γ)
higher when Γ is more inclusive - even if the maximal values for  (Γ) and/or  (Γ)
are unchanged or even a little lower - maximal cartel size can shrink and with it the
collusive price.
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8 Concluding Remarks
This paper is an initial foray into how competition policy impacts the inclusiveness of
cartels. We found that the presence of antitrust enforcement causes the most inclusive
stable cartels to be less inclusive and, in particular, small firms that might have been
cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members.
Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, the presence of antitrust enforcement can
either increase or decrease their inclusiveness, depending on market conditions.
A potentially interesting extension is to allow cartels to use exclusionary tactics
to restrain the supply of non-cartel members. The current analysis presumes that
non-cartel members do not restrain their supply in that they price just below the
cartel’s price and produce up to capacity (see Bos and Harrington, 2010). This is
obviously detrimental to the cartel and, in practice, some cartels have augmented their
collusive price-setting with exclusionary activities intended to constrain the supply
of non-cartel members. For example, in the district heating pipes cartel, the Swedish
firm Powerpipe did not join the cartel and eventually complained to the European
Commission that there was a cartel which was acting in a predatory manner against
it.25 The use of exclusionary activities also explains why non-cartel members are a
common source of discovery of cartels. Hay and Kelley (1974) found that 12 out of
49 U.S. Department of Justice cases were discovered by means of a "complaint by
a competitor" and was the second most common source of detection. This raises
an interesting trade-oﬀ. A partially inclusive cartel could be made more profitable
by engaging in exclusionary activities against non-cartel members but doing so runs
the risk of those non-cartel members complaining and the cartel being discovered.
Encompassing those factors in our model could produce some new insight into both
the structure of cartels and the properties of collusive practices.
25This example, and other ones, can be found in Harrington (2006) and Marshall, Marx, and
Samkharadze (2011).
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9 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. If the ICC is not binding, then ∗ (Γ) is independent of
 (Γ)   (Γ), and . If the ICC is binding, then ∗ (Γ) satisfies
Ω (Γ) = Γ (∗ (Γ))− ( −Γ) (33)
where Ω (Γ) is defined in (4). If   (Γ)(Γ), then
Ω (Γ)
 (Γ) = −
µ (Γ)  (1− ) + 
[1−  (1−  (Γ))]2
¶
 0 Ω (Γ) (Γ) = −
 (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))  0
Ω (Γ)
 = −
µ (Γ) (Γ)−  +  (1−  (Γ))
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
 0
If   (Γ)(Γ), then
Ω (Γ)
 (Γ) = −
µ (Γ)  (1−  (Γ)) [1−  (1−  (Γ))] +  (1−  (Γ) (Γ) )
[1−  (1−  (Γ))]2
¶
 0
Ω (Γ)
 (Γ) = −
 (1−  (Γ))  (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))  0
Ω (Γ)
 = −
 (1−  (Γ))  (Γ) (Γ)
1−  (1−  (Γ))  0
Given that Ω (Γ) is decreasing in  (Γ)   (Γ), and  then, at higher values for those
parameters, (33) implies
Ω (Γ)  Γ (∗ (Γ))− ( −Γ) 
It follows that ∗ (Γ) must decline so that  (∗ (Γ)) is increased and Γ(∗(Γ))−(−Γ)
is decreased in order to satisfy the ICC.
Proof of Lemma 5. Theorem 4 in Bos and Harrington (2010) shows that the
cartel value without antitrust enforcement,  ∗(Γ) is greater when the cartel is more
inclusive: if Γ0 ⊂ Γ00 then  ∗(Γ00)   ∗(Γ0). Consider the all-inclusive cartel: Γ =  .
As there are no outsiders, it is trivially externally stable. By assuming  (Γ) = 0
- that is, an insider who leaves the cartel can expect the static Nash equilibrium -
it follows from  ∗()  0 that it is internally stable. Therefore,  is stable in the
absence of antitrust enforcement.
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider some cartel Γ0. The collusive value per unit of
capacity for cartel Γ0 is
 ∗ ¡Γ0¢ = µ1− (Γ0)(Γ0)
1− (1− (Γ0))
¶
(∗ ¡Γ0¢− )µ(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)Γ0
¶
(34)
and recall that the value to firm  ∈ Γ0 is  ∗ (Γ0)  Let us contrast this with the
collusive value per unit of capacity for cartel Γ00 ≡ Γ0\{} that excludes firm  ∈ Γ0 :
 ∗ ¡Γ00¢ = µ1− (Γ00)(Γ00)
1− (1− (Γ00))
¶
(∗ ¡Γ00¢− )µ(∗ (Γ00))− ( −Γ0 + )Γ0 − 
¶
 (35)
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Comparing (35) with (34), cartel Γ00 generates more value per unit of capacity than
cartel Γ0 when:µ
1− (Γ00)(Γ00)
1− (1− (Γ00))
¶
(∗ ¡Γ00¢− )µ(∗ (Γ00))− ( −Γ0 + )Γ0 − 
¶

µ
1− (Γ0)(Γ0)
1− (1− (Γ0))
¶
(∗ ¡Γ0¢− )µ(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)Γ0
¶

Rearranging this inequality yields:
(∗ (Γ00)− )
³(∗(Γ00))−(−Γ0+)Γ0− ´
(∗ (Γ0)− )
³(∗(Γ0))−(−Γ0)Γ0 ´ 
(1− (Γ0)(Γ0))(1− (1− (Γ00)))
(1− (Γ00)(Γ00))(1− (1− (Γ0)))  (36)
Consider the LHS of (36) as  → 0
lim→0
(∗ (Γ00)− )
³(∗(Γ00))−(−Γ0+)Γ0− ´
(∗ (Γ0)− )
³(∗(Γ0))−(−Γ0)Γ0 ´ = lim→0
(∗ (Γ00)− ) [(∗ (Γ00))− ( −Γ0)]
(∗ (Γ0)− ) [(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)] 
When  (·) = 0, lim→0 ∗ (Γ00) = lim→0 ∗ (Γ0)  By Theorem 1,  (·)  0 implies
lim→0 ∗ (Γ00) ≥ lim→0 ∗ (Γ0) because, as  → 0, cartel Γ0 is equivalent to cartelΓ00 but with a higher probability of discovery  =  (Γ0). Therefore, lim→0(∗ (Γ00)−) [(∗ (Γ00))− ( −Γ0)] ≥ lim→0(∗ (Γ0)−) [(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)] which im-
plies the LHS of (36) is at least one. Next consider the RHS of (36). Re-arranging
the expression, it is strictly less than one iﬀ
 £(Γ0)− (Γ00)¤+(1− )  £(Γ0)(Γ0)− (Γ00)(Γ00)¤+(Γ0)(Γ00) £(Γ0)− (Γ00)¤  0
This condition holds because of A4 and A5: lim→0 (Γ0)  lim→0 (Γ00) and(Γ0) ≥ (Γ00) We have then shown that the firms in Γ00 earn a higher payoﬀ when
firm  is not a member of the cartel, compared to when it is a member. By our spec-
ification, if firm  departs from cartel Γ0 then the remaining cartel members respond
with the accommodative equilibrium.
The second step is to show that firm  prefers to depart from cartel Γ0 when the
accommodative equilibrium ensues in which case Γ0 is not internally stable. Firm ’s
payoﬀ in the cartel isµ
1− (Γ0)(Γ0)
1− (1− (Γ0))
¶
(∗ ¡Γ0¢− )µ(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)Γ0
¶
 (37)
and outside of the cartel is
(∗ (Γ00)− )
1− (1− (Γ00))  (38)
Given that
1
1− (1− (Γ00)) 
1− (Γ0)(Γ0)
1− (1− (Γ0))
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then (38) exceeds (37) if
∗ ¡Γ00¢−  ≥ (∗ ¡Γ0¢− )µ(∗ (Γ0))− ( −Γ0)Γ0
¶

Given lim→0 ∗ (Γ00) ≥ lim→0 ∗ (Γ0) then this condition holds.
In sum, as  → 0, cartel Γ0 is not stable because firm  finds it more profitable
to be outside of the cartel assuming the cartel accommodates its departure and,
given the remaining cartel members are better oﬀ with the departure, they do indeed
accommodate it. Therefore, if a firm’s capacity is suﬃciently small, it is not a member
of a stable cartel.
Proof of Theorem 8. Recall that, without antitrust enforcement, a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a cartel Γ to sustain a collusive price is
1
1−  
Γ
 ()− ( −Γ) 
Hence, if
1
1−  ≤
Γ
 ()− ( −Γ)  (39)
then ∗ (Γ) =  and cartel Γ is (trivially) internally unstable. As postulated for when
there is no antitrust enforcement, suppose Γ0 is a minimal stable cartel and ∗ (Γ) = 
for all Γ ⊂ Γ0 which means (39) holds. We want to show that, in the presence of
antitrust enforcement, the equivalent condition to (39) holds for all Γ ⊂ Γ0 which
means the minimal stable cartel is not a subset of Γ0.
With antitrust enforcement, the analogue to (39) is
Ω (Γ) ≡
µ
1−  (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ))
¶
+min { (Γ) (Γ)  }  ≤ Γ ()− ( −Γ)  (40)
To see that (39) implies (40), note that the RHS’s are the same, whereas the LHS of
(40) is lower. As to the latter, if  (Γ) (Γ) ≥ , then we need
1−  ( (Γ) (Γ)− )− (1−  (Γ))
1−  (1−  (Γ)) ≤
1
1−  
which holds. If  (Γ) (Γ)  , then we need
1− (1−  (Γ)) (Γ) (Γ) 
1−  (1−  (Γ)) ≤
1
1−  
which also holds. Hence, with antitrust enforcement, ∗ (Γ) =  and therefore Γ is
internally unstable for all Γ ⊂ Γ0.
Proof of Theorem 9. In the absence of antitrust enforcement, suppose Γ0 is a
stable cartel, Γ00 is not a stable cartel where Γ00 ⊂ Γ0, and ∗ (Γ00)   Note that, in the
absence of antitrust enforcement, internal stability of Γ00 is satisfied by specifying the
aggressive equilibrium when a cartel member fails to join. Thus, if Γ00 is not stable,
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it is because it is not externally stable. Now suppose there is antitrust enforcement
and let  (Γ00) =  and min { (Γ00 ∪ {}) :  ∈ Γ00} = ; that is,  is the smallest
probability of conviction that results from an outsider joining Γ00. By continuity with
the case of no antitrust enforcement, if  ' 0 then Γ00 is internally stable. By setting
 ' 1, Γ00 is externally stable because another firm joining the cartel is unprofitable
due to the high rate of conviction making it very likely the cartel will shut down.26
26That the penalty multiple, , does not matter is because cartel shutdown is forever. If instead
the cartel was allowed to reform then the same theorem would be true but, in addition to  ' 1, we
would need  to be suﬃciently high so that expected penalties are suﬃciently high.
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10 Online Appendix: Proof of Conditions for the Prop-
erty in Theorem 9 to Hold (Not for Publication)
Theorem 9 showed that antitrust enforcement can reduce minimal cartel size. A
key requirement for this to occur is that, in the absence of antitrust enforcement,
there exists some subset of a minimal cartel that is able to sustain a price above
costs. If this requirement is not met, then we know by Theorem 8 that antitrust
enforcement will not lead to smaller minimal cartels. This raises the issue of when
without antitrust enforcement there exists a cartel Γ such that: 1) Γ is stable, 2) Γ0
is unstable for all Γ0 ⊂ Γ and 3) there exists a cartel Γ0 ⊂ Γ for which ∗ (Γ0)  . In
the following, we present suﬃcient conditions for this property to hold.
• Step 1: Derive conditions under which a cartel Γ is stable.
To begin, assume that () = 1 −  and  ' 1. Thus, for a given cartel Γ, the
ICC is not binding. In this case, the optimal cartel price is given by
∗ (Γ) = 1− +Γ + 
2

For Γ to be internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium it must hold that
∗(Γ)  , which requires
Γ   −() '  − 1 + 
This cartel is externally stable when none of the outsiders finds it profitable to join,
which is the case when
µ
1
1− 
¶
[∗ (Γ)− ]  ≥
µ
1
1− 
¶
[∗ (Γ ∪ {})− ]
µ
1− ∗ (Γ ∪ {})− ( −Γ − )
Γ + 
¶
 ∀ ∈ Γ
or
∗ (Γ)−  ≥ [∗ (Γ ∪ {})− ]
µ
1− ∗ (Γ ∪ {})− ( −Γ − )
Γ + 
¶
∀ ∈ Γ
By using
∗ (Γ ∪ {}) = 1− +Γ +  + 
2

the external stability condition reduces to
(Γ + ) [∗ (Γ)− ] ≥ (∗ (Γ ∪ {})− )2 ∀ ∈ Γ
Substituting ∗ (Γ) = 1−+Γ+2 and ∗ (Γ ∪ {}) = 1−+Γ++2 and rearranging
gives
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Γ ≥
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2 ⇔
q
2Γ − ( − 1 + )2 ≥  ∀ ∈ Γ
which implies Γ   − 1 + . We therefore conclude that a cartel Γ is stable when
the following condition holds:
Γ ≥
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2∀ ∈ Γ
• Step 2: Derive conditions under which the cartel is minimally stable.
Let us now show when Γ0 is unstable for all Γ0 ⊂ Γ. Towards that end, consider
cartels that involve the largest firms: Γ () ≡ {1 } and define  by
1 + · · ·+ −1 ≤  − 1 +   1 + · · ·+ 
Thus, ∗ (Γ ())   and ∗ (Γ ()) = , ∀   Cartel Γ () is therefore the smallest
cartel for which a price above cost is sustainable. Observe that there always exists a
 for which this condition is satisfied since for  = 2 we have 1 ≤  − 1 + , which
holds by assumption and for  =  we have  − 1 +   1 + · · ·+  ⇔ 1−   0,
which again holds by assumption.
Next, suppose there exists  satisfying:
1 + · · ·+ −1 
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2
and q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2 ≤ 1 + · · ·+ 
We show below that such an  exists and is unique. Now consider a cartel Γ ()
for which    . Such a cartel is unstable because: 1) If  ∈ {   − 1}, then
it is internally stable through the aggressive equilibrium, but externally unstable as
firm  + 1 wants to join; and 2) If  ∈ {2  − 1}, then it is internally unstable
as ∗ (Γ ()) = . By contrast, the cartel Γ () is stable because: 1) it is internally
stable since 1 + · · ·+  ≥
q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2 implies 1 + · · ·+    − 1 + 
and thus ∗ (Γ ())  ; and 2) it is externally stable because firm +1 prefers not to
join. In turn, this implies that firm  prefers not to join ∀   + 1 That is, if firm
 + 1 does not want to join the cartel containing the  largest firms, then all smaller
firms do not want to join either.
As a final step, let us show that Γ () is not only stable, but also minimally stable.
We know that
1 + · · ·+ −1 
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2
So, the cartel Γ ( − 1) is not externally stable. Next consider any Γ ⊂ Γ (). If
∗ (Γ) = , then Γ is not internally stable. If ∗ (Γ)  , then it is internally stable,
but not externally stable because
1 + · · ·+ −1 
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2 (41)
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implies X
∈Γ
 
q
2 + ( − 1 + )2 for  ∈ Γ and  ≤  (42)
This is true, because 1+ · · ·+−1 ≥P∈Γ  . Therefore, the LHS of (42) is smaller
than the LHS of (41) and the RHS of (42) is weakly larger than the RHS of (41).
Hence, firm  ∈ Γ would choose to join Γ, which means that all Γ ⊂ Γ () are unstable.
The cartel Γ () is therefore not only stable, but also minimally stable.
• Step 3: Derive conditions under which a subset of Γ () can sustain
a collusive price.
What remains is to find  such that    ≥ . That is, there are subsets of the
minimal stable cartel Γ () that have suﬃcient capacity to support a collusive price.
For such a subset it must hold that
 − 1 +   1 + · · ·+  
q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2
Note that if this condition is not satisfied for  =  so thatq
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2 ≤ 1 + · · ·+ 
then it does not hold for any    (as the RHS is increasing in  and the LHS
is non-increasing in ). Thus, the necessary and suﬃcient condition is that ∃ such
that:
1 + · · ·+ −1 ≤  − 1 +   1 + · · ·+  
q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2
This means that the smallest cartel that is able to sustain a collusive price (cartel
Γ ()) needs to be externally unstable.
To conclude, let us show that  exists and is unique. Define  by
 ( − 1)  0 ≤  () 
and let
 () ≡ 1 + · · ·+  −
q
2+1 + ( − 1 + )2
Note that  () is strictly increasing in . Hence, if  (1)  0   (), then there
exists a unique  such that:  ( − 1)  0 ≤  (). For  (1)  0, it must hold that
1 −
q
22 + ( − 1 + )2  0
This inequality is satisfied whenq
( − 1 + )2  1 ⇔  − 1  1− 
which is true by assumption. For  ()  0, it must hold that
 −
q
( − 1 + )2  0⇔ 1−   0
which too holds by assumption. Thus, there exists a unique  such that  ( − 1) 
0 ≤  ().
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